Interesting and controversial analysis. Admittedly, Friedman's claim about the key role of classical geopolitics and sea power in the U.S. entry into World War I does not stand up to any criticism. In 1917, there were circumstances more critical than the threat to U.S. maritime trade in the Atlantic. And the main threat (paradoxically) was not at sea but on land. On January 17, 1917, Arthur Zimmermann, the Kaiser's German foreign minister, sent a coded telegram to Johann Heinrich Bernstorff, the German ambassador in Washington. Zimmermann's telegram (infamous “Zimmermann-Depesche”) contained a plan to involve Mexico in the war against the U.S.

The telegram reported that Germany planned to launch an all-out submarine war against Entente vessels, but would try to ensure that attacks by German U-boats would not harm American ships so that the U.S. would have no reason to violate its neutrality. In the event that Washington decided to enter the war, the German Ambassador to Mexico Heinrich von Eckardt was instructed to contact the President of Mexico to encourage him to start military action against the United States on the side of the Central Powers.

In case of victory, Germany promised after the war to give Mexico the territories previously annexed by the United States - the southern states of Texas, New Mexico and Arizona.

The telegram was intercepted by British intelligence and decrypted by the Admiralty's cryptographic service ("Room 40"). After certain diplomatic precautions were taken, the telegram was transmitted to the United States and was released to the press on March 1.

In April 1917, the telegram was the primary document used by U.S. President Thomas Woodrow Wilson to justify declaring war on Germany. Thus, even the factual aspect of the US entry into the war contradicts Friedman's view of the role of sea power - the final decision was made under the pressure of other circumstances and threats.